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Healthy people sometimes report experiences and beliefs that are strikingly similar to the symptoms of
psychosis in their bizarreness and the apparent lack of evidence supporting them. An important
question is whether this represents merely a superﬁcial resemblance or whether there is a genuine and
deep similarity indicating, as some have suggested, a continuum between odd but healthy beliefs and
the symptoms of psychotic illness. We sought to shed light on this question by determining whether
the neural marker for prediction error - previously shown to be altered in early psychosis – is
comparably altered in healthy individuals reporting schizotypal experiences and beliefs. We showed
that non-clinical schizotypal experiences were signiﬁcantly correlated with aberrant frontal and striatal
prediction error signal. This correlation related to the distress associated with the beliefs. Given our
previous observations that patients with ﬁrst episode psychosis show altered neural responses to
prediction error and that this alteration, in turn, relates to the severity of their delusional ideation, our
results provide novel evidence in support of the view that schizotypy relates to psychosis at more than
just a superﬁcial descriptive level. However, the picture is a complex one in which the experiences,
though associated with altered striatal responding, may provoke distress but may nonetheless be
explained away, while an additional alteration in frontal cortical responding may allow the beliefs to
become more delusion-like: intrusive and distressing.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Psychologically healthy people have an array of experiences,
ideas and beliefs that may, on occasion, seem to overlap with
those that characterize both emerging and established psychosis
(David, 2010; Kretschmer, 1925). Research that has focused on
identifying and quantifying these beliefs and relating them to
psychiatric illnesses has inspired the growing idea that psychotic
experience exists as a part of a continuum (Linscott & van Os,
2010). Clearly, clinical psychosis entails experiences and beliefs
that are sufﬁciently intrusive and distressing to have a marked
effect on individuals’ quality of life and functioning. However, it
can be extremely difﬁcult to develop an operational way of
determining what is or is not a part of normal experience, and
it is correspondingly difﬁcult to distinguish clearly between a
belief that is truly delusional and one that is merely unusual,
arcane or irrational (Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999b). It is
a challenge to develop our understanding of these healthy but
strange experiences and beliefs and their implications for our.045
: þ1 203 974 7662.
tt).
BY license.understanding of psychotic mental illness. Do high scores on
schizotypy scales, which document these experiences, reﬂect an
increased vulnerability to psychotic illness? Does the existence of
the symptom-like experiences in the healthy population prove
that psychosis lies on a continuum with normal mental function?
Establishing the phenomenological similarity between psychosis
and schizotypy will only provide partial answers to these ques-
tions. To characterize the relationship more fully, we suggest that
it is important to determine whether there is overlap at the
neurobiological level.
Our initial prediction, based on our own studies using purely
behavioral measures (Corlett, Simons et al., 2009; Moore, Dickinson,
& Fletcher, 2011b; Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, Wolpert, & Fletcher,
2010) was that our fMRI observations would favor a continuum
model. However, key to this study was the acknowledgment that it
is possible to have a behavioral similarity while, nevertheless, the
underlying neural basis of altered beliefs in schizotypy and in
psychosis might be quite different. In this respect, we see the fMRI
measure as a valuable, even an essential tool, in addressing fully
questions such as this.
To that end, we sought to relate schizotypy to neural responses
in an associative learning task. While undergoing functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), healthy subjects completed
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patterns of prediction error (PE) signal across subjects. In block-
ing, prior learning leads to an attenuation of new learning such
that there is a subsequently reduced expectation that a blocked
stimulus has predictive power. Imagine that I have repeatedly
learned that eating chicken causes an allergic reaction. If I eat a
meal containing chicken and spinach, a subsequent allergic
reaction is wholly predicted (by the presence of chicken in the
meal) and I should develop no expectation that spinach has
allergenic potential (in other words, learning about spinach has
been ‘‘blocked’’). If I now eat spinach alone and suffer an allergic
reaction, this is relatively surprising: a prediction error results.
This was the manipulation made in the current experiment. We
made behavioral measures of expectancies as well as fMRI
measures of neural responses during both blocking (low PE) and
subsequent expectancy violation (high PE) trials in order to assay
individual variability in blocking. Blocking was chosen because it
enables a ﬂexible characterization of PE signal (across low and
high PE trials) and, moreover, it has already been explored
behaviorally in healthy subjects whose responses are predictive
of the severity of their attenuated psychosis-like experiences: for
example, positive schizotypy scores on the OLIFE scale predict
weaker blocking (Moore, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2011a; Moran,
Al-Uzri, Watson, & Reveley, 2003) – consistent with these attenu-
ated positive symptoms forming under the inﬂuence of an aberrant
learning process, like clinical delusions (Corlett, Murray et al., 2007).
Participants’ schizotypal and related personality traits were
quantiﬁed using the Chapman Scales (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983)
and the Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI, Peters, Joseph, & Garety,
1999, see below). They then completed the blocking task during
fMRI scanning. This entailed learning causal relationships
between foods and allergic responses.
In prior work, we found that inappropriate dorsolateral prefron-
tal PE signal during causal learning in patients with psychosis was
predictive of the severity of delusions (Corlett, Murray et al., 2007).
Evidence that aberrant right frontal PE signal relates to schizotypy
would therefore favor a continuummodel of psychosis ranging from
high schizotypy in health to delusional belief in psychotic illness
(Johns & van Os, 2001). However, a lack of comparable relationship
between inappropriate prediction error responding and schizotypal
features would, we argue, call into question any simple idea that
schizotypy can be seen as an attenuated form of psychosis. Rather,
such a negative ﬁnding would be more consistent with a conception
of high schizotypy as a phenocopy of clinical symptoms: phenom-
enologically similar but neurobiologically separable and to some
degree distinct from psychosis (Meehl, 1989).2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Eighteen (eight female) right-handed, healthy volunteers were recruited through
local advertisement for a combined functional imaging and psychopharmacology
study in which they completed this causal learning task and other cognitive tasks in
the fMRI scanner as well as a placebo controlled behavioral study on the effects of
ketamine separated from the scanning session by at least a month (data reported
elsewhere). No subjects reported a history of psychiatric illness, drug abuse or contra-
indications for MRI. We excluded subjects with any history of alcoholism as well as
current smokers (Domino, Mirzoyan, & Tsukada, 2004; Krystal et al., 2003; Petrakis
et al., 2004). The study was approved by the Cambridge Local Research and Ethics
Committee and was carried out in accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). One subject was excluded upon
discovery of a past history of psychiatric illness.
2.2. Schizotypy scales
There are numerous self-report rating scales that can be used to capture the
various dimensions of schizotypal personality (Claridge & Beech, 1995). We chosethe Chapman scales (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976, 1978; Eckblad &
Chapman, 1983) and the Peters Delusion Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) because
they formed the basis of prior behavioral work relating aberrant PE and salience to
schizotypy (Corlett, Simons et al., 2009).
2.3. Chapman scales
We administered the four scales developed by Chapman and colleagues to
assess schizotypy: (1) The physical anhedonia scale (Chapman et al., 1976)
consisting of 61 true –false items that measure a deﬁcit in the ability to experience
pleasure; (2) the social anhedonia scale (Chapman et al., 1976), 40-items, which
tap social withdrawal and indifference to other people; (3) the perceptual
aberrations scale (Chapman et al., 1978), 28-items that assess experience of the
internal and external world that share surface similarities with many of the
perceptual/attentional disruptions documented in the earliest phases of psychosis
(Chapman, 1966) and (4) the magical ideation scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983),
30 items that assess endorsement of causal mechanisms that are invalid or
metaphysical (e.g. telekinesis). Subjects completed all questions from these scales
in a randomized order so as not to reveal or emphasize particular themes (Laurent
et al., 2000). Given our thematic focus on delusions as aberrant causal inference
(Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007), we were particularly interested in the magical
ideation scale scores. However, for completeness, the scores on the other scales
were included in our multiple regression analysis with PE neural responses (see
below).
2.4. Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI)
Subjects completed the 21-item PDI with pen and paper (Peters, Joseph, Day, &
Garety, 2004a). This scale was constructed to gather more information about the
common and seemingly benign psychosis-like beliefs in the general population
(van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). Face validity with clinical delusions was
assured by using the Present State Examination (PSE) delusional themes (Wing,
Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974) as a template for constructing items. Items were
adapted for healthy, non-psychotic individuals by prefacing items with a relative,
‘‘as if’’ extension (e.g. ‘‘Does it ever feel as ify?’’). Furthermore, the PDI attempts to
capture the multidimensionality of delusions; Peters claims: ‘‘It is not what you
believe but how you believe it’’ (Peters et al., 2004a); as such, for every belief
endorsed, subjects are required to ﬁll out 5-point Likert scales that assess the
degree of distress, pre-occupation and conviction associated with the belief. The
degree of distress associated with a particular belief, rather than the total number
of beliefs endorsed, distinguishes healthy non-clinical odd beliefs from clinical
delusions (Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999a; Sisti et al., 2012)
The validity of the PDI was ascertained from its construction (it is based on the
PSE); furthermore, PDI scores correlate with other measures of delusions (Peters,
Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004b) including the BPRS subscales pertaining to delusions
(Kao, Wang, Lu, Cheng, & Liu, 2012), adding construct validity. In prior work, we
used PSE and BPRS delusions scores to relate prediction error brain signal to drug
induced and endogenous delusions (Corlett et al., 2006; Corlett, Murray et al.,
2007). Furthermore, the relative ‘‘as if’’ statements are very similar to the
phenomenological descriptions of ﬁrst episode psychosis patients in the formative
delusional-mood stage of their psychopathology (Gross & Huber, 1972) and
healthy subjects administered a psychotomimetic dose of ketamine (Corlett,
D’Souza, & Krystal, 2010). Hence, the PDI is particularly relevant for our current
purposes.
Given the discriminant power of PDI distress scores, with regards to odd
versus clinically relevant beliefs, distress scores formed the focus of our PDI
analyses. However, total number of beliefs endorsed and participants’ scores on
the other dimensions were included in our multiple regression model relating PDI
with PE brain responses (see below).
2.5. Functional neuroimaging of PE signal
We used an established causal learning approach (Corlett et al., 2004; Turner
et al., 2004), in which learned expectations are violated to produce a prediction
error (Corlett et al., 2004). We examined Kamin blocking, in which prior learning
interferes with what is subsequently acquired (Kamin, 1969, see Figure 1 for task
design). Subjects were asked to imagine themselves working as an allergist
confronted with a new patient ‘‘Mr. X’’. Trials composed of presentation of a food
picture (representing a meal eaten by Mr. X), a predictive button push response by
the subject and, following this, an allergic-reaction or no reaction outcome.
Subjects held the button down longer the more conﬁdent they felt in their
prediction (Corlett et al., 2004, 2006; Corlett, Murray et al., 2007), providing a
sensitive assay of learning as follows:
Predictive strength¼ R length of button pushð Þ
R is the predictive response (coded by þ1 for prediction of an allergy and 1 for
prediction of no allergy). The blocked cue induces a near zero score, since subjects
should not learn about it.
Figure 1. Study design. (a) Task Design. Target and control conditions for the
food-allergy causal learning tasks. Subjects see that bananas cause an allergy in
their patient. Subsequently they see that bananas and mushrooms cause the
allergy. Their prior learning about bananas should block new learning about the
mushrooms. In the ﬁnal phase of training, subjects see the mushrooms causing the
allergy; this violates any blocking that took place in the previous stage. Blocking
trials are compared to control events that are matched for the presence of allergy
as well as novelty and familiarity (Avocado and Chillies). Likewise, at stage 3, there
were trials matched for novelty and familiarity that act as comparators for the
blocking violation events. (b) Trial design. On each trial, subjects saw a meal that
their patient had eaten for 3 s. During this time, they made a prediction response –
pushing one button to predict an allergy and another to predict no allergy. They
also held the button down for longer the more conﬁdent that they were making
the right choice. Next they were shown the effect of that meal on their patient. If
he suffered an allergy, they would see the words Allergic Reaction in red letters
with a jagged border for 1 s. If there was no allergy, subjects saw the words no
allergy in green letters with a green rectangle around it for 1 s.
Table 1
Summary of task design.
Stage 1 (learning,
10 repetitions)
Stage 2 (blocking,
6 repetitions)
Stage 3 (violation,
6 repetitions)
Role
A1þ A1B1þ B1þ Violation of
Blocking
A2þ A2B2þ B2 Conﬁrmation of
blocking
C1 C1D1þ D1þ Control for
blocking
violation
C2 C2D2þ D2 Violation of
control cue
EF EF Stage 2, 2 foods
no allergy
GH GH Stage 2, 2 foods
no allergy
Iþ Iþ Iþ Consistent
Allergy
J J J Consistent No
Allergy
Letters represent the food cues, a ‘‘þ ’’ symbol denotes the presence of an allergy
and a ‘‘ ’’ symbol connotes the absence of allergy following those particular
food cues.
The contrasts of interest were deﬁned as follows:
Blocking (stage 2): ([C1D1,C2D2][A1B1,A2B2])
Blocking violation (stage 3): [B1þ][D1þ]
For the regression analyses: for Stage 2, for each subject a contrast image of
blocking trials compared with their control trial ([C1D1,C2D2]  [A1B1,A2B2]) was
entered into the regression model. For Stage 3, we entered contrast images that
captured stage 3 blocking violation {[B1þ][D1þ]} into the regression model.
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To set up blocking, subjects initially learned that a food predicted allergy and
then experienced the same food paired with a novel food, this pairing causing an
allergy of equivalent magnitude. Under such circumstances, as described above,
they should learn little or nothing about the novel food. Finally, during the key
phase, blocked novel foods were presented either with an allergic outcome (which
would be relatively surprising) or without it (which would be relatively
predicted). Comparing the prediction error condition with a well-matched control
condition (see Figure 1) enables a quantiﬁcation of individuals’ prediction error
signals in key brain regions. This signal has previously served as a prediction error
assay enabling us to conﬁrm an associative, PE-driven explanation for theacquisition of causal beliefs (Corlett et al., 2004). In the current study, we were
primarily interested in the degree to which it would correlate with schizotypal
beliefs and experiences.2.5.2. Trial sequence
Training consisted of three phases: Learning, in which prior expectancies were
developed; Blocking, in which those prior expectancies ‘blocked’ new learning;
and Violation, which provided a metric for the strength of blocking (see Figure 1
for more information). Subjects saw 10 repetitions of each trial-type during the
initial learning phase, they then saw 6 repetitions of each trial-type during the
blocking phase and ﬁnally six repetitions of each trial-type in the ﬁnal violation
stage. There were ﬁller cues that balanced expectancies about the presence or
absence of a predictive relationship across cues (see Table 1 for further clariﬁca-
tion). Furthermore, subjects were presented with two independent blocking
contingencies across the training stages – one was conﬁrmed at Stage 3 (i.e. the
blocked cue did not cause the allergy) and one was violated (the blocked cue was
shown causing the allergy). We used the same food stimuli as employed in our
prior work (Corlett et al., 2004, 2006; Corlett, Murray et al., 2007; Turner et al.,
2004). As before, the roles assigned to particular food cues were counterbalanced
across subjects (Corlett et al., 2004, 2006; Corlett, Murray et al., 2007; Turner et al.,
2004), as were the relative positions of the foods on screen, such that attentional
biases to particular parts of the screen did not develop (Dommett et al., 2005;
Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005).
On each trial, food cues were presented on the screen for 3 s, outcomes for 1 s
(see Figure 1). There was a 500 ms inter-trial interval and ﬁxation trials
(4 s resting events in which no behavioral response was required and a ﬁxation
cross appeared at the center of the screen). These events were presented on
average once every ten trials across the task, as in our previous work with this task
(Corlett et al., 2004, 2006; Corlett, Murray et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2004).2.6. Behavioral data analysis
We focused our behavioral analyses on conﬁrming that blocking did indeed
occur in our subjects. To this end, we planned a paired t-test on subjects’
prediction conﬁdence for the ﬁrst trial of stage 3 on which they see the blocked
cue alone (mushrooms in Figure 1) compared with their initial prediction the ﬁrst
time they saw the blocking control cue alone (Chili in Figure 1). Mean predictive
conﬁdence ratings were calculated such that subjects’ responses to the initial
presentations of blocking and control cues for both contingencies (conﬁrmed and
violated) both contributed to the behavioral analysis. This was legitimate because
until this point (i.e. before subjects saw the outcome at the ﬁrst trial of stage 3),
the novelty, familiarity and contingency with the outcome of these parallel causal
contingencies were identical.
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We used a Siemens Trio scanner operating at 3 T. A total of 720 gradient echo
T2n-weighted echo-planar images depicting blood oxygenation level-dependent
contrast were acquired for each subject. The ﬁrst seven images were treated as
‘‘dummy’’ scans and discarded to avoid T1 equilibration effects. The remaining
images covered the three task phases that ran continuously, in series: stage 1
(learning) followed by stage 2 (blocking) followed by stage 3 (violation). This was
crucial; subjects did not know that there were different learning phases, which
encouraged the application of prior learning to current prediction that is so critical
to the blocking effect. Images were positioned parallel to the anterior
commissure–posterior commissural line and comprised 35 slices, each of 2 mm
with a 0.5 mm interslice gap. A repetition time of 1620 ms was used with an echo
time of 30 ms and 901 ﬂip angle. The scanner has a 192 mm ﬁeld of view with a
6464 data matrix.
2.6.2. fMRI data analysis
fMRI data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK; http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The average haemody-
namic response to each event was designated at the presentation of the outcome.
Trials were modeled using a canonical, synthetic haemodynamic response func-
tion (Friston et al., 1998), used as a covariate in a general linear model. A
parameter estimate was generated for each voxel for each event. Responses were
parametrically modulated by the subjects’ conﬁdence in their prediction for that
event. Individuals’ contrast images, derived from the pair-wise comparisons
between key events, were then entered into a second-level group analysis for
each of the stages. Given our a priori hypotheses and prior work (Corlett et al.,
2006; Corlett, Murray et al., 2007), we used the PickAtlas tool (Maldjian, Laurienti,
Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) to conﬁne analyses to a single mask comprised of a series
of regions of interest (ROI), total volume 1805 voxels. The ﬁve ROIs combined into
the mask were: right lateral prefrontal cortex (rPFC, a sphere of radius 10 mm
centered on 50, 30, 28 – based on our prior work (Corlett et al., 2004; 2006;
Corlett, Murray et al., 2007; Fletcher et al., 2001; Turner et al., 2004), left and right
striatum and left and right substantia nigra (deﬁned anatomically using the
PickAtlas tool, Maldjian et al., 2003).
Brain responses to events that violated blocking (i.e. events when the blocked
cue was shown causing the allergy, Mushrooms in Figure 1) were compared with
unsurprising control cues (Chili in Figure 1). Subjects who blocked most should be
most surprised by the blocked cue causing the allergy, indexed as more extensive
fronto-striatal activation in response to such trials.
We also identiﬁed brain responses to blocking trials (banana and mushrooms,
Figure 1) relative to matched control events (avocado and chillies, Figure 1). This
comparison revealed the brain regions engaged during the blocking process.
2.7. Relating PE brain signal to odd beliefs
We aimed to determine the relevance of variability in PE-responsiveness to
individual differences in schizotypy, speciﬁcally magical ideation and the degree
of distress caused by the beliefs captured on the PDI (see above). Therefore, we
constructed two separate multiple linear regression models for the Chapman
scales and PDI, incorporating regressors for each of the subscales within each
statistical model. This allowed us to explore the relationship between PE brain
responses and important dimensions of odd beliefs, accounting for the fact that
there were subscales that were not pertinent to the present analysis but should
nevertheless be included in the model (e.g. social and physical anhedonia from the
Chapman scales).
We aimed to determine the relevance of individual PE-responsiveness to
schizotypy. Therefore, we computed correlations between phase 3 violation-
related activation in the ROI mask and magical ideation and PDI distress (as two
separate statistical models), reasoning that weaker blocking would be associated
with an attenuated surprise response when the blocked cue was observed causing
the allergy (relative to a matched control contingency). We applied small volume
correction for multiple comparisons (Worsley et al., 1996). For each correlation we
report the z-score in the particular regions. All reported ﬁndings were associated
with false discovery rate corrected p-values less than 0.05 (Genovese, Lazar, &
Nichols, 2002). For illustrative purposes we plot the relationships between brain
responses and behavioral ratings. We are aware of the potential for statistical non-
independence or circularity in correlative analysis (Vul & Pashler, 2012) and hence
we do not re-compute Pearson’s r-values for the relationship between the
parameter estimates from our fMRI models and the cognitive measures of interest.3. Results
3.1. Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI)
Subjects PDI scores were comparable to published scores for
healthy control subjects (Corlett, Simons et al., 2009; Murray,Corlett, & Fletcher, 2010). Their mean number of endorsements on
the PDI was ﬁve out of 21 questions (s.d.¼3.1; patients with
schizophrenia endorse 10.9 þ/ 9.3, Corlett, Simons et al., 2009;
Murray et al., 2010). Our subjects’ mean distress rating regarding
their beliefs was 11.8 (s.d.¼10.7), their mean pre-occupation with
the unusual beliefs they endorsed was 11.9 (s.d.¼9.6) and their
mean conviction regarding those beliefs was 15.5 (s.d.¼11.4).
Again, these values are consistent with prior reports of PDI scores
in healthy control subjects (Corlett, Simons et al., 2009; Murray
et al., 2010).
3.2. Chapman scales
Subjects’ scores on the Chapman scales were comparable to
prior published work in healthy volunteer subjects (Corlett,
Krystal, Taylor, & Fletcher, 2009). Their mean self-reported level
of magical ideation was 4.6 (s.d.¼3.5), mean self-rated perceptual
aberration was 3.8 (s.d.¼4.6), mean physical anhedonia was 8.8
(s.d.¼4.2) and mean social anhedonia was 5.6 (s.d.¼4.0).
3.3. Blocking behavior
Subjects evidenced behavioral blocking. They were less likely
to predict an allergy when confronted with a blocked cue, and
their predictions were less conﬁdent (t¼7.169, 2-tailed, d.f.¼16,
po0.0001).
3.4. Neural responses to blocking (stage 2)
Blocking trials were associated with an attenuated response in
rPFC relative to control trials (x¼42, y¼18, z¼20, z-score¼2.85,
po0.05).
3.5. Violation of blocking (stage 3)
Presenting the blocked cue causing the allergy engendered a
PE response in rPFC (x¼42, y¼18, z¼20. z-score¼2.50. po0.05)
and bilateral head of caudate (x¼6, y¼16, z¼6. z-score¼2.99,
po0.05; x¼4, y¼14, z¼6. z-score¼2.23 po0.05), when compared
with control trials.
3.6. Relating metrics across stage, brain and behavior
In order to assess the consistency between learned predictions
and brain responses across stages 2 and three, ﬁrst we regressed
subjects’ behavioral predictions about the blocked cues on trial
1 of stage 3 onto their brain responses during blocking (stage 2).
Subjects with the strongest rPFC response to blocking (stage 2)
learned inappropriately, predicting allergy following the blocked
cue at stage 3 (peak voxel, x¼42 y¼36 z¼16; z-score¼3.96
po0.05). Second, we regressed stage 2 brain responses during
blocking onto stage 3 brain responses to its violation. There was
an inverse relationship between PE brain responses to blocking
trials at stage 2 and those in response to the violation of blocking
at stage 3 (peak voxel, x¼46 y¼32 z¼26; z-score¼2.60 po0.05).
That is, those subjects who activated DLPFC during blocking
showed an attenuated surprise response when they observed
the blocked cue causing the allergy.
3.7. Psychosis-like experiences and prediction error
3.7.1. Magical ideation (Chapman scales)
The severity of subjects’ baseline magical ideation correlated
negatively with the magnitude of their striatal PE response to the
blocked cue causing the allergy; suggesting that subjects report-
ing most pronounced magical ideation were most likely to have
Figure 2. The relationship between striatal prediction error response and magical ideation. Rendering of the relationship between magical ideation score and striatal
prediction error signal. Plot on the left depicts the signal (beta-weight parameter estimates) in left striatum (peak voxel: x¼16 y¼16 z¼2), regressed upon magical
ideation score; the right hand plot depicts the beta weights from the peak voxel in the right striatum: x¼4 y¼8 z¼4, regressed upon the magical ideation score.
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y¼16 z¼2, z-score¼2.86, po0.05; Right: x¼4 y¼8 z¼4,
z-score¼2.45, po0.05, see Figure 2).3.7.2. Distress associated with odd beliefs (PDI)
PE in the frontal cortex, striatum and midbrain was negatively
predictive of the degree of distress that those beliefs caused. That
is, people with highest degrees of such distress showed least PE
response to violation of blocking-induced expectation in frontal
cortex (x¼54 y¼18 z¼24; z-score¼3.07 po0.05), striatum
(x¼14 y¼14 z¼6; z-score¼3.01, po0.05) and midbrain
(x¼14 y¼22 z¼6; z-score¼2.97, po0.05, see Figure 3).
These results suggest that the subjects who learned inappropri-
ately about the blocked cue (and hence were less surprised when
that cue caused the allergy) were more likely to be distressed by
their odd beliefs.3.8. Post-hoc analysis – relating PDI distress with stage 2 blocking
responses
As a measure of the consistency across learning phases, we
explored the relationship between PE response during blocking
(which ought to have been attenuated, based on prior learning)
and PDI distress score. As predicted, there was a positive relation-
ship between aberrant PE during blocking and PDI distress score.
Subjects with inappropriate DLPFC responses during blockingtrials were most distressed by their odd beliefs (x¼44 y¼34
z¼38; z-score¼2.40 po0.05).
3.9. Post-hoc analysis – relating other subscales with
stage 3 violation responses
For completeness, we explored the relationships between
other subscales of the Chapman and Peters scales. No regions
correlated with Chapman perceptual aberration, social or physical
anhedonia subscales.
Neither endorsement nor pre-occupation showed any relation-
ship with PE brain responses, however, the degree of conviction
did correlate with DLPFC prediction error responses. Like distress,
there was a negative relationship between belief conviction and
DLPFC response at stage 3 (x¼52, y¼20, z¼32, z-score¼3.16,
po0.05) suggesting that those subjects who were less surprised
at the blocked cue causing the allergy were more convinced by
the odd beliefs that they endorsed.
Given our a priori focus on magical ideation and distress as
well as our concern about limiting the number of statistical
comparisons, we do not discuss these observations further.4. Discussion
In healthy participants, self-reported unusual beliefs, as well
as the distress accompanying them correlated with PE brain
signals in ways that overlap intriguingly with our previous
Figure 3. Relating fronto-striatal prediction error signal to distress associated with odd beliefs. Rendering of the relationship between PDI distress score and midbrain,
frontal and striatal prediction error signal. Plot depicts the signal in right DLPFC (peak voxel: x¼54 y¼18 z¼24, beta-weights) regressed upon PDI distress score.
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healthy people reporting such unusual beliefs showed a relative
attenuation of brain responses to events that, on the basis of prior
experience, ought to be relatively surprising. Given prior observa-
tions in people with clinical psychosis (Corlett, Murray et al.,
2007; Murray et al., 2008) and in healthy participants under
ketamine administration (Corlett et al., 2006), this observation is
compatible with the suggestion that unusual, but non-clinical,
beliefs show more than just superﬁcial overlap with full psychotic
symptoms. The results appear consistent with a continuummodel
of attenuated psychotic symptoms whereby these unusual mental
phenomena represent a milder form of the clinical delusions that
attend serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia (Claridge,
1985). In support of this notion, the degree of distress associated
with these unusual beliefs was associated with variation in right
frontal prediction error signal. What seems to distinguish people
who harbor unusual ideas from those who present clinically with
delusions is that the latter suffer signiﬁcantly more distress
(Peters et al., 1999b). In the present study, healthy people who
held their odd beliefs more like patients (with associated distress)
also had prediction error brain responses redolent of patients
with clinical delusions (Corlett, Murray et al., 2007).
On the other hand, we also observed a signiﬁcant association
between striatal prediction error signal and the degree of self-
reported magical ideation. We have not observed such an asso-
ciation in our work with clinical samples (Corlett, Murray et al.,
2007). This result suggests we ought to temper our endorsementof the continuum model slightly. Overall, the ﬁndings would be
consistent with the following speculation: the striatal PE ﬁnding
suggests that perhaps healthy unusual ideas have their source in
aberrant striatal functioning. Unlike clinical delusions, this level
of ideation does not impact upon an individual too detrimentally.
Indeed, they may ﬁnd it personally, socially and even ﬁnancially
advantageous (Nettle & Clegg, 2006). However, if unusual beliefs
are associated with inappropriate right frontal cortical dysfunc-
tion, more like that of a deluded patient, then belief is associated
with a degree of distress. This ﬁnding is more consistent with a
quasi-dimensional perspective on the relationship between schi-
zotypy and psychosis (Claridge & Beech, 1995). That is, the
schizotypal personality measures and striatal prediction error
signaling could represent formes frustes of clinical psychosis that
must interact with other factors such as stress or the consump-
tion of psychotogenic drugs in order to manifest as the full clinical
symptom.
Another important factor that distinguishes so-called healthy
odd beliefs from delusions is the degree of social support and
conﬁrmation that the believer experiences (Peters et al., 1999b). It
will be crucial to explore social anhedonia and reduced social
interactions as mediating factors in rendering striatally mediated
unusual experiences and ideas stressful and therefore pathologi-
cal in terms of prefrontal function.
These ﬁndings are consistent with recent discussions of multi-
ple learning systems in the brain; a striatal controller which
represents simple contingencies between events in the world
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more complex prefrontal system which is computationally
intense and processes the complicated relationships between
those simple contingencies; perhaps even representing a world-
model (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). On the basis of the present data,
we argue that a striatal system capable of entertaining irrelevant
associations is not necessarily detrimental and, given the link
between creativity and healthy schizotypy (Nettle & Clegg, 2006)
that we may have a neural signature of individuals’ abilities to
generate novel or unusual associations (‘‘outside the box’’ think-
ing) (de Manzano, Cervenka, Karabanov, Farde, & Ullen, 2010).
However, if those novel associations impact upon the prefrontal
representation of the world, then the world can become an
unpredictable and distressing place, akin to that of a patient with
delusional beliefs (Corlett, Krystal et al., 2009; Corlett, Taylor,
Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010).
This explanation shares some surface similarities with
Coltheart and colleagues’ neuropsychological model of delusions
in which delusions are explained with two factors; a deﬁcit in
belief evaluation associated with right frontal cortex dysfunction
and a deﬁcit in some other system that conveys the delusion’s
content (Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2007).
Coltheart argues that for the salient experiences that attend
delusions in schizophrenia, the striatum represents the neural
locus of factor 1 (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2010). However,
we believe that a hierarchical processing model, invoking no clear
distinction between experiences and beliefs, provides a more
compelling model for understanding fronto-striatal interactions
and co-contributions to internal models of the world (Corlett,
Taylor et al., 2010). Both regions code prediction error signals
(striatum, within a model and prefrontal across models,
Waldmann & Martignon, 1998) and it is prediction error function
and dysfunction that contributes to healthy and abnormal belief
formation (Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This idea of a hierarchically
organized system draws on the predictive coding model of neural
function in which a primary purpose of neural interactions is to
minimize prediction error in pursuit of maximizing the accuracy
of predictions of the environment and thus optimizing interac-
tions with it (Friston, 2005). Since prediction error is the driving
force in shaping such a system, we argue that schizotypal
beliefs can be directly generated, inﬂuenced and modiﬁed by
its alteration.
Given incentive learning theories of psychosis (Kapur, 2003), it
is important to consider whether the responses in striatum during
our task reﬂect a reward prediction error response and thus,
whether reward prediction errors pertain to delusions (Kapur,
2003) and non-clinical odd beliefs. This is particularly pertinent
since it is those striatal responses that relate to healthy magical
ideation, which in new religious movement populations has been
shown to correlate with rewarding feelings of social inclusion
(Peters et al., 1999b). We do not posit a role for reward prediction
error in the present results for three reasons: First, the task does
not deliver primary or secondary rewards. Second, our study
subjects present a striatal signal when they make a prediction and
have it violated – they are not garnering reinforcement from
making correct responses. Third, theories of striatal function tend
to support a role in signaling salience and expectancy violation
rather than simply reward. Striatum also responds to punishment
(Menon et al., 2007; Romaniuk et al., 2010; Schiller, Levy, Niv,
LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008), as well as events that are neither
rewarding nor punishing but that are novel or alerting (Zink,
Pagnoni, Martin, Dhamala, & Berns, 2003). We do not feel our data
examine reward prediction error per se, but rather prediction
errors in the context of causal inference (Dickinson, 2001;
Redgrave & Gurney, 2006). The present data suggest that the
fronto-striatal circuit engaged by this causal inference process(Corlett et al., 2004), is composed of regions differentially related
to aspects of healthy odd beliefs in a manner consistent with
component regions of the circuit coding different aspects of predic-
tion error driven causal inference (Waldmann & Martignon, 1998).
Further, these data provide some insight into the complex relation-
ship between clinical delusions and schizotypal odd beliefs. The
speciﬁc roles of striatal and frontal prediction error signals in
generating and maintaining healthy and problematic beliefs will
be an important subject for future studies.
In conclusion, on one hand, our data favor the continuum idea
by providing evidence of overlap between prediction error dys-
function in psychosis and in schizotypal beliefs. However, close
inspection of our neural data suggests that this is not a simple
continuum and that non-clinical odd beliefs may be mediated by
a striatal system that is distinct from that which causes patholo-
gical delusions (in right frontal cortex). Consistent with this idea,
those healthy subjects whose unusual beliefs appeared more like
those of patients with psychosis (i.e. being held with greater
conviction and accompanied by distress) were more likely to
show a patient-like rPFC PE dysfunction (Corlett, Murray et al.,
2007). On the other hand, simple endorsement of odd beliefs was
not associated with right PFC PE but with striatal prediction error
signal, a pattern that has not been observed in patients with
endogenous psychosis in the context of causal inference and
belief formation.
We acknowledge of course that this is a small sample of
subjects. But these admittedly preliminary data demonstrate the
potential value of a cognitive neuroscientiﬁc approach in explor-
ing links between schizotypy and psychosis and in examining the
environmental, neural and cognitive factors that contribute to
schizotypy and interact with it to increase the risk of transition to
psychotic illness, for example childhood trauma (Dominguez,
Saka, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2010). We note with interest that
in an animal model of such developmental trauma, associative
blocking (and therefore prediction error processing) was also
impaired (Beauchamp, Gluck, Fouty, & Lewis, 1991). Future work
could use this relationship between neural prediction error signal
and psychopathology to explore the transition from risk to
psychosis. Data such as these are likely to have implications for
our understanding of psychotic symptoms, our notion of risk for
psychosis and perhaps the persistence of psychotic phenotypes
despite the ﬁtness costs associated with this illness (David, 2010).Acknowledgments
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